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THE MISSING MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS THEORY
Mary-Rose Papandrea*
One hundred years ago, Justice Holmes embraced the marketplace of
ideas in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States.1 The same year as
this centennial anniversary, Justice Kennedy, one of the most ardent adherents to this theory, retired from the Supreme Court. The dovetailing of these
two events offers the perfect excuse to evaluate the marketplace of ideas in
the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence today.
The marketplace of ideas drives many of the Court’s First Amendment
decisions, from the public forum doctrine to restrictions on offensive expression to campaign finance. Although the theory is not perfect, this Article
contends Kennedy should have embraced the lessons from this dissent
more—not less—in some of his First Amendment opinions. In particular,
Kennedy often failed to use the marketplace of ideas theory to guide his
thinking on public school students and government employees as well as in
cases involving the government speech doctrine. Furthermore, in these cases
where the Court—often but not always led by Kennedy—has abandoned the
marketplace of ideas as a guiding principle, it has frequently embraced ad
hoc balancing tests. Although such tests may be appealing because they permit courts to take into account a range of factors excluded from traditional
First Amendment analysis—such as the value of the speech, various types of
harms it causes, and alternative restrictions—they also give the government
far too much discretion to censor and punish speech that it does not like and
favor speech that it does. The Court’s decisions involving public school students, government employees, and the government speech doctrine illustrate
this problem all too well.
Part I outlines the general principles of the marketplace of ideas theory
of expression. Part II explores the Court’s application of this theory with a
focus on Kennedy’s opinions. Part III argues that in cases involving public
school students, government employees, and the government speech doctrine, the Court and Kennedy frequently lost sight of the marketplace of
ideas theory. Kennedy’s approach allows the government to manipulate the
© 2019 Mary-Rose Papandrea. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame
Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Judge John J. Parker Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina
School of Law.
1 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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marketplace of ideas in these contexts by giving the government wide authority to make content-based and even viewpoint-based speech restrictions.
I. THE MARKETPLACE

OF

IDEAS

Prior to his memorable dissent in Abrams v. United States,2 Holmes was
the author of the majority opinions in Schenck v. United States,3 Frohwerk v.
United States,4 and Debs v. United States.5 As some scholars have argued,
Holmes moved toward a more civil-libertarian position in the summer of
1919 due to his correspondence with other judges and scholars.6 Whatever
the cause for Holmes’s shifting attitude, his Abrams dissent provides significant protection for the freedom of expression and severely limits the power
of the government to restrict speech. Although at first blush Holmes’s marketplace of ideas metaphor might appear to be an overly simplistic and
deeply flawed comparison to the commercial marketplace, a close read of
that opinion reveals much more significant guiding principles that have
guided the Court in many of its First Amendment decisions of the last century. Once we have a deeper understanding of the marketplace of ideas theory, we can consider how the Supreme Court—and Kennedy in particular—
used this marketplace of ideas theory in the last several decades.
Although the phrase “marketplace of ideas” has entered not only the
Court’s First Amendment opinions but also our common parlance, a complete understanding of what Holmes meant in Abrams remains a matter of
debate. Indeed, even though Holmes’s dissent is often cited as proposing a
theory of the First Amendment based on the marketplace of ideas, the opinion never uses precisely that phrase.7 Instead, Holmes referred to the “competition of the market.”8
On the one hand, Holmes’s metaphor has lots of surface appeal, especially today. Our current communications environment feels like a marketplace, if not a very crowded and noisy street fair. We are blasted with
information and different voices fighting for our attention (and, in many
cases, financial support). The internet has lowered if not eliminated the barriers to entry so that everyone can have a voice, not just the most powerful or
the very rich. The traditional media no longer has such a dominant
2 Id. at 624–31.
3 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
4 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
5 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
6 See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 198–211
(2004). Some scholars disagree with Stone’s assessment. See, e.g., Sheldon M. Novick, The
Unrevised Holmes and Freedom of Expression, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 304 (“Historical evidence
has been used selectively in this debate. Viewed as a whole, the evidence shows without
much doubt that Holmes’s views did not change, and that Schenck and Abrams were cut
from the same bolt.”).
7 See Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 24.
8 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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gatekeeping role in determining what information makes its way into the
public conversations.
But if this theory simply equates the freedom of speech with the commercial marketplace, the theory has little persuasive force. Many scholars
have pointed out the many ways our marketplace of ideas is inherently
flawed. As with the commercial marketplace, the playing field is not even.
Even with the internet, people do not all have the same resources to speak or
the same access to the most powerful avenues of communication. The voices
of those with more power, or wealth, or fame (or all three) are not only
louder and more visible, but they are also amplified in both new and traditional media. Given this uneven playing field, the marketplace of ideas analogy does not necessarily restrict the government power to restrict speech but
instead might actually support government intervention to make sure this
marketplace is “fair.”
Most depressingly, some studies suggest that our very psychological
makeup works against the power of the marketplace of ideas. People tend to
seek others who already agree with them and embrace their prior beliefs
even more strongly when they are confronted with opposing views.9 The
recent explosion of “fake news” on social media has led even more people to
doubt that the free exchange of ideas can lead to truth.10 Getting to the
“truth” (if one ever does) can take a very long time. Some recent psychological studies suggest that the quest for ultimate agreement is particularly
unlikely because people tend to become even more entrenched in their positions when they hear contrary ones.11 The faith the marketplace of ideas
theory has in people as rational actors often feels misplaced. Relatedly, the
marketplace of ideas theory feels particularly out of place in the context of
certain speech questions where there is a disparity of knowledge and the ability to assess information, such as commercial speech and speech between
various professional actors (like doctors and lawyers) and their clients.12
But before we give up on the marketplace of ideas theory—at least as
presented in Holmes’s famous dissent—we should recognize that it is not
simply an embrace of a free-market trade in facts and idea. Instead, as Professor Vincent Blasi has argued, the Abrams dissent “contains the seeds of an
understanding of the First Amendment that has more to do with checking,
character, and culture than with the implausible vision of a self-correcting,
knowledge-maximizing, judgment-optimizing, consent-generating, and par9 See Christopher A. Bail et al., Exposure to Opposing Views on Social Media Can Increase
Political Polarization, 115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 9216 (2018).
10 See generally Dawn Carla Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, 94 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1519 (2019).
11 See, e.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, Why Facts Don’t Change Our Minds, NEW YORKER (Feb. 19,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/02/27/why-facts-dont-change-ourminds.
12 See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2366 (2000).
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ticipation-enabling social mechanism.”13 A deeper reading of Holmes’s
opinion reveals several layers of important guiding principles for considering
the scope of First Amendment protection, including a distrust for government interference with speech unless serious harm is imminent, a concept
that is useful for more than simply determining the incitement doctrine; a
“reality check” that sometimes seemingly harmful speech is spoken by “puny
anonymities” who pose no real threat to peace and order; and most importantly, a grave distrust of government efforts to squelch speech with which it
disagrees (evident in Holmes’s condemnation of the Sedition Act of 1798).14
Although the Court has not always specified the theory of free speech
that supports its decision in individual cases, the influence of Holmes’s
famous Abrams dissent is evident throughout its one hundred years of First
Amendment decisions. Kennedy, who was on the bench for almost thirty
years, has helped solidify the Court’s reliance on this theory of the First
Amendment.
II. THE MARKETPLACE

OF

IDEAS

IN

JUSTICE KENNEDY’S OPINIONS

The marketplace of ideas theory has played a dominant role in the
Court’s free speech jurisprudence and in Kennedy’s opinions in particular.
Adamantly opposed to content-based and viewpoint-based speech restrictions, Kennedy has opposed efforts to exclude speakers from the public fora,
has expressed deep faith in the power of counterspeech, railed against the
dangers of permitting the government to censor or punish speech it does not
like, equated free speech with liberty and democracy, and refused to permit
the curtailing of “offensive” speech. In addition, he has led the Court’s rejection of ad hoc balancing tests that would weigh the value of the speech
against the weight of the government’s interest in restricting it.
Throughout his twenty years on the bench, Kennedy repeatedly asserted
that the First Amendment does not tolerate the abridgement of speech in
public fora. For Kennedy, these public places are the epicenter of the marketplace of ideas, where all people can share their thoughts and ideas directly
with other citizens, and any government efforts to restrict speech in these
areas should be regarded with suspicion. For example, in his concurrence in
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, in which he argued
that a ban on the distribution of literature in an airport is unconstitutional,
he argued that “[o]ne of the primary purposes of the public forum is to provide persons who lack access to more sophisticated media the opportunity to
speak.”15 Kennedy took issue with the majority’s application of the public
forum doctrine, arguing that it gave the government far too much power to
limit free speech. Here, Kennedy expressly stated that “[t]he First Amendment is a limitation on government” power and “[i]ts design is to prevent the
13
14
15
nedy,

Blasi, supra note 7, at 2.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627, 629–30 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 709 (1992) (KenJ., concurring).
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government from controlling speech.”16 Kennedy rejected the majority’s
more wooden view of the public forum doctrine that permitted the government to classify public spaces as nonpublic fora dedicated to nonspeech uses.
Instead, Kennedy argued for an evolving and flexible view of the public
forum doctrine where the lowliest and poorest among us could engage in
public debate. Throughout his time on the Supreme Court, Kennedy frequently voted to strike down speech restrictions as violative of the public
forum doctrine. Indeed, in one of his last opinions, Kennedy suggested that
in light of technological changes, the new public forum might be online.17
Kennedy robustly defended speakers’ rights in a public forum even
when that speech is offensive to some listeners. In Hill v. Colorado, for example, he wrote a separate dissent angrily attacking the majority for upholding
speech restrictions surrounding abortion clinics, declaring that “[i]f from
this time forward the Court repeats its grave errors of analysis, we shall have
no longer the proud tradition of free and open discourse in a public
forum.”18 In soaring rhetoric that is classic Kennedy, he declared that “[t]he
liberty of a society is measured in part by what its citizens are free to discuss
among themselves.”19 He rejected arguments that women entering abortion
clinics should not have to listen to speech they might find offensive because
it was precisely in that location that abortion opponents might be able to
change some minds.20 He concluded, “[i]n a fleeting existence we have but
little time to find truth through discourse.”21 Kennedy took this same
approach in Snyder v. Phelps, where he joined Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
protecting the right of the Westboro Baptist Church to engage in offensive
speech on a public sidewalk.22 Citing the Court’s statement in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan that “[t]he First Amendment reflects ‘a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
16 Id. at 695.
17 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (“A fundamental
principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places where they can
speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more.”). In this opinion,
Kennedy protected the rights of a sex offender, among the most reviled of all members of
our society, to use social media. See id. at 1737 (“By prohibiting sex offenders from using
those websites, North Carolina with one broad stroke bars access to what for many are the
principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and
listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human
thought and knowledge.”).
18 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 765 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Kennedy also
joined Justice Scalia’s concurrence in McCullen v. Coakley asserting this same principle. See
573 U.S. 464, 505 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Protecting people from speech they do
not want to hear is not a function that the First Amendment allows the government to
undertake in the public streets and sidewalks.”).
19 Hill, 530 U.S. at 768 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 789 (“For these protesters the 100-foot zone in which young women enter a
building is not just the last place where the message can be communicated. It likely is the
only place.”).
21 Id. at 792.
22 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
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uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,’”23 Roberts declared that the Church’s
speech on a matter of public concern was entitled to constitutional
protection.
Kennedy has frequently rejected government efforts to restrict speech
because it is “offensive,” even when it is not occurring in a public forum.
Kennedy’s Supreme Court career is bookended with cases in which he
rejected restrictions on offensive speech. One of the first Supreme Court
First Amendment cases in which Kennedy participated is Texas v. Johnson,24
in which the Court upheld the right of a Vietnam War protestor to burn the
American flag on the steps of a courthouse. Near the end of his career, Kennedy made clear that his objection to viewpoint-based speech restrictions had
not diminished one iota. In Matal v. Tam, for example, he joined Justice
Alito’s majority opinion striking down a ban on “offensive” trademarks.25 In
his Tam concurrence, Kennedy excoriated the government, emphasizing his
concerns that such a policy permits the Trademark Office to engage in viewpoint discrimination.26 He asserted that “the Court’s precedents have recognized just one narrow situation in which viewpoint discrimination is
permissible: where the government itself is speaking or recruiting others to
communicate a message on its behalf.”27
In his Tam concurrence, Kennedy fleshed out why he thinks it is important for the government to tolerate offensive speech. He explained that
while it is always disconcerting when the government restricts viewpoint,
“[t]hat danger is all the greater if the ideas or perspectives are ones a particular audience might think offensive, at least at first hearing. An initial reaction may prompt further reflection, leading to a more reasoned, more
tolerant position.”28 In addition, Kennedy expressed concern that “[b]y
mandating positivity, the law here might silence dissent and distort the marketplace of ideas.”29 Government efforts to silence offensive speech are also
dangerous:
A law that can be directed against speech found offensive to some portion of the public can be turned against minority and dissenting views to the
detriment of all. The First Amendment does not entrust that power to the
government’s benevolence. Instead, our reliance must be on the substantial
safeguards of free and open discussion in a democratic society.30

Kennedy’s concerns about offensive speech restrictions reflect his
aggressive approach to content-based and speaker-based speech restrictions,
an approach that is rooted expressly in his adherence to the marketplace of
ideas theory of the First Amendment. His majority opinion in Citizens United
23 Id. at 452 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
24 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
25 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1768.
28 Id. at 1767.
29 Id. at 1766.
30 Id. at 1769.
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v. FEC31 offers the best example of his antipathy to these sorts of speech
restrictions. In Citizens United, the Court struck down as unconstitutional a
federal statute prohibiting corporations from making independent campaign
contributions.32 Kennedy explained that speaker-based speech restrictions
were just as suspect as content-based speech restrictions because “[s]peech
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a
means to control content.”33 He concluded that restricting corporate speech
in order to level the playing field “is wholly foreign to the First Amendment”34 and impermissibly “interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas
protected by the First Amendment.”35 Kennedy concluded that government
may not engage in censorship “to command where a person may get his or
her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear” because
“[t]he First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.”36
Kennedy (and the Court more generally) has demonstrated a high tolerance for false speech. Holmes’s dissent does not directly address whether the
government can restrict false statements of fact; arguably the marketplace of
ideas does not require inaction in the face of clear falsity. Nevertheless, the
Court has rejected attempts to restrict false speech. The Court first grappled
with false speech in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, where the Court noted
that false statements are nevertheless “inevitable in free debate” and held
that false and defamatory speech about public officials could not be punished absent actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for falsity).37 In later cases, the Court declared that although “[f]alse statements of
fact are particularly valueless” and “interfere with the truth-seeking function
of the marketplace of ideas,” they are not completely without First Amendment protection.38
None of Kennedy’s opinions embrace protection for false speech more
than his plurality opinion in United States v. Alvarez.39 In Alvarez, the Court
struck down the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, a federal law that criminalized false
representations about the receipt of military honors.40 Although Kennedy
31 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
32 Id. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), Kennedy joined both Justice
Thomas’s majority opinion and Justice Alito’s concurring opinion making clear that subject-matter speech restrictions posed just as much threat to the marketplace of ideas as
viewpoint-based speech restrictions.
33 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
34 Id. at 350 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
35 Id. at 354 (quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208
(2008)).
36 Id. at 356.
37 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271, 279–80 (1964).
38 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988). Kennedy did not participate in this case. The case had been argued and submitted for decision before he was
confirmed. Id. at 47.
39 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (plurality opinion).
40 Id. at 713–15.
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acknowledged that the Court had suggested in several prior decisions that
false speech stood outside of the First Amendment because it does not contribute to the marketplace of the ideas,41 he adamantly rejected the government’s argument that false speech was outside of the First Amendment or
could constitute a new category of unprotected speech.42 Instead, these
prior decisions permitted restrictions on false speech in limited situations
where some sort of legally cognizable harm would result.
Although Kennedy agreed that the government had a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of military honors,43 he concluded that there
was a “lack of a causal link between the Government’s stated interest and the
Act.”44 The Government argued that false claims of military honors “dilute
the value and meaning of military awards,”45 but Kennedy said that the Government has presented “no evidence to support its claim that the public’s
general perception of military awards is diluted by false claims such as those
made by Alvarez.”46 Kennedy did not even bother to address arguments that
the Stolen Valor Act was constitutional because true medal holders might
feel “offend[ed]” or “might experience anger and frustration.”47 This is consistent with Kennedy’s rejection in other cases of “offense” as a reason to
restrict speech.
Once he concluded that false speech was not outside of the First Amendment, Kennedy embraced the idea of counterspeech as the cure, citing Justice Brandeis’s Whitney v. California concurrence48 and asserting, “[t]he facts
of this case indicate that the dynamics of free speech, of counterspeech, of
refutation, can overcome the lie.”49 Kennedy has a strong belief that
counterspeech can be effective: “The response to the unreasoned is the
rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple truth.”50 Indeed, Kennedy notes that the facts of Alvarez itself supported
the marketplace of ideas at work. Xavier Alvarez was a board member of a
water district board in Claremont, California, and, as Kennedy summarizes in
the first line of his opinion, “[l]ying was his habit.”51 The lie about his Congressional Medal of Honor was “a pathetic attempt to gain respect that
eluded him.”52 This attempt failed immediately, as he was quickly ridiculed
41 Id. at 718–19 (citing such cases).
42 Id. at 719 (“The Court has never endorsed the categorical rule the Government
advances: that false statements receive no First Amendment protection.”).
43 Id. at 724–25.
44 Id. at 726.
45 Id. (quoting Brief for United States at 54, Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (No. 11-210)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 727–28 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)).
49 Id. at 726.
50 Id. at 727–28 (citing Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
51 Id. at 713.
52 Id. at 714.
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online, and another board member asked him to resign.53 If anything, Kennedy concluded, “the outrage and contempt expressed for respondent’s lies
can serve to reawaken and reinforce the public’s respect for the Medal, its
recipients, and its high purpose.”54 Notably, Kennedy concluded that “suppression of speech by the government can make exposure of falsity more
difficult, not less so.”55
Kennedy feared that upholding this law would mean that “there could
be an endless list of subjects the National Government or the States could
single out.”56 Echoing Holmes’s admonition that it is not necessary to suppress the speech of “puny anonymities,” Kennedy pointed out that anti-lying
laws could punish speech “whether shouted from the rooftops or made in a
barely audible whisper.”57 Kennedy asserted, “[o]ur constitutional tradition
stands against the idea that we need Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.”58
In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., Kennedy again wrote for the Court, declaring that a law banning the sale and use of information about pharmaceutical
prescriptions violated the First Amendment as a content-based and speakerbased law subject to strict scrutiny.59 Kennedy made clear that facts are just
as entitled to First Amendment protection as opinions.60 He also rejected
blatant assertions that information can be restricted because it can be used in
bad or negative ways.61 Specifically, he rejected the State of Vermont’s assertion that the people of Vermont want this law because it makes them feel
“anxious” that their doctors may not have their patients’ best interests in
mind.62 Kennedy noted that doctors do not have to talk to pharmaceutical
representatives but that they probably continue to do so because they find
these visits useful.63
Kennedy’s concerns about restricting “false” speech relate to his passionate resistance to compelled speech. In one of his last opinions, a concurrence in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra,64 Kennedy
joined Justice Thomas’s majority opinion rejecting the creation of “professional speech” as a new category of lesser-protected speech.65 Among other
things, Thomas reasoned that professionals “have a host of good-faith disagreements” that are best left to the marketplace of ideas to sort out and
warned that “the people lose when the government is the one deciding which
53 Id. at 727.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 728.
56 Id. at 723.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011).
60 See id. at 570.
61 See id. at 575–77.
62 Id. at 576.
63 Id.
64 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
65 Id. at 2371–72.
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ideas should prevail.”66 In his separate concurrence in Becerra, Kennedy specifically attacked the California law for compelling speech. Quoting Wooley v.
Maynard and mocking the California State Legislature’s proclamation that
the law under review was “forward thinking,” Kennedy asserted, “it is not forward thinking to force individuals to ‘be an instrument for fostering public
adherence to an ideological point of view [they] fin[d] unacceptable.’”67
Kennedy also joined the Court in fighting back efforts to move to balancing tests that weigh the value of speech against the government’s interest in
restricting it.68 In United States v. Stevens,69 for example, then–Solicitor General Elena Kagan argued that the Court should reject a First Amendment
challenge to a law criminalizing depictions of animal cruelty because
“[w]hether a given category of speech enjoys First Amendment protection
depends upon a categorical balancing of the value of the speech against its
societal costs.”70 Writing for an almost unanimous Court (except Alito),
Roberts declared, “[a]s a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage,
that sentence is startling and dangerous.”71 Roberts concluded unequivocally and with some sense of outrage that “[o]ur Constitution forecloses any
attempt to revise that judgment [that benefits of restrictions on the government outweigh the costs] simply on the basis that some speech is not worth
it.”72
In so many decisions, Kennedy led the Court’s charge against viewpointbased and subject-matter based speech restrictions, the creation of new categories of unprotected or lesser-protected speech, arguments in favor of “balancing” the marketplace, and laws that restricted speech regarded as
“offensive.” His commitment to these principles appears unwavering; he
speaks in quasi-philosophical terms about how these principles are essential
to our democracy and to our liberty. Kennedy has argued that “the creation
of standards and adherence to them, even when it means affording protection to speech unpopular or distasteful, is the central achievement of our
First Amendment jurisprudence.”73 Ad hoc balancing tests, he has con66 Id. at 2374–75.
67 Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (alterations in original) (first quoting Joint
Appendix at 39, Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (No. 16-1140), 2008 WL 388836; then quoting
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from the Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273, 275–76 (2009) (pointing out that “[i]n theory, this
approach seems sensible, but in practice it proved unworkable”).
69 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
70 Id. at 470 (quoting Brief for the United States at 8, Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (No. 08769)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 785 (1996)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part). In the same decision, Justice Souter also recognized that adherence to these general
principles “keeps the starch in the standards for those moments when the daily politics
cries loudest for limiting what may be said.” Id. at 774 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing
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tended, fail to provide “notice and fair warning”74 about how courts will analyze speech restrictions; instead, such an approach permits judges to “wander
into uncharted areas of the law with no compass other than our own opinions about good policy.”75
III. THE MISSING MARKETPLACE

OF

IDEAS THEORY

Although the marketplace of ideas plays an important role in the Court’s
First Amendment jurisprudence, and in Kennedy’s opinions especially, a
closer look at the caselaw reveals that Kennedy—and the Court more generally—invokes this theory selectively.76 The marketplace of ideas is not as
entrenched in the Court’s First Amendment doctrine, at least when it comes
to less-favored speakers like public school students and government employees, and when the Court is grappling with the still-developing government
speech doctrine. In these contexts, the Court—including Kennedy—has
given the government exactly the same broad authority to make contentbased, speaker-based, and even viewpoint-based distinctions that are anathema outside of these areas.
A.

Public School Speech

One of the most famous lines from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District is that “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate.”77 Ever since Tinker, which embraced a robust version of student speech rights, the Court has been clawing back student
speech rights, and in so doing has abandoned its commitment to the marketplace of ideas.78 Although the abandonment of the marketplace of ideas
theory in the university setting has been less apparent, the Court’s most
recent decision in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez79 suggests a weakening
commitment to the marketplace of ideas in that setting as well.
Tinker represents the high–water mark for student speech rights. In that
case, the Court considered whether a public school could constitutionally
Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449,
474 (1985) (arguing that “courts . . . should place a premium on confining the range of
discretion left to future decisionmakers who will be called upon to make judgments when
pathological pressures are most intense”)).
74 Id. at 785 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
75 Id. at 787.
76 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has also pointed out that the Supreme Court is not
always dedicated to the freedom of expression, although he has focused on the Roberts
Court in particular and has not specifically focused on the marketplace of ideas theory. See
Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723 (2011).
77 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
78 For more detail on the Court’s K–12 First Amendment jurisprudence, see MaryRose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027 (2008).
79 561 U.S. 661 (2010).
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punish three students for wearing to school black armbands in protest of the
Vietnam War.80 While the Court recognized that it must evaluate the students’ speech rights “in light of the special characteristics of the school environment,”81 the Court’s commitment to the marketplace of ideas carried the
day. Citing Terminiello v. Chicago,82 the Court made clear that schools could
not repress speech based simply on “undifferentiated fear or apprehension
of disturbance,”83 a line that is consistent with Holmes’s Abrams dissent.
Tinker expressed grave concern about schools becoming “enclaves of totalitarianism” that regard students as “closed-circuit recipients” of state-approved
messages or information.84 Leaving no doubt that the marketplace of ideas
was the driving theory behind its decision, the Court expressly noted that
student speech is an important part of the “marketplace of ideas” and that
“personal intercommunication among the students” is “an important part of
the educational process.”85 The Court concluded that schools could prohibit
only speech that created a “material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline,” not speech that merely provokes discussion.86
The Court’s commitment to student speech rights has diminished
sharply since Tinker. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court held
that schools could prohibit lewd speech, even though the sexually suggestive
speech at issue did not meet Tinker’s substantial disruption test.87 Instead,
after declaring that at least the school did not engage in viewpoint discrimination,88 the Court permitted schools to restrict speech in order to promote
“socially appropriate behavior”89 and to prevent the undermining of “the
school’s basic educational mission.”90 The Court explained that the speech
was “plainly offensive to both teachers and students—indeed to any mature
person.”91 In holding that the freedom of speech must give way in the face
of the school’s role to teach students the “boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior,” the Court asserted that “the First Amendment gives a high school
student the classroom right to wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s
jacket.”92 The Court suggested various bases for its decision but no clear
80 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
81 Id. at 506.
82 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
83 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
84 Id. at 511; see also id. at 513 (“Freedom of expression would not truly exist if the
right could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent government has provided as a
safe haven for crackpots.”).
85 Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
86 Id. at 511.
87 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
88 Id. (“[T]he penalties imposed . . . were unrelated to any political viewpoint.”).
89 Id. at 681.
90 Id. at 685.
91 Id. at 683.
92 Id. at 682–83 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Newman, J., concurring in the result) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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standard aside from an ad hoc balancing approach that gave virtually no
weight at all to the student speech rights.93 In dissent, Justice Marshall
pointed out that both the district court and court of appeals had concluded
that the school had failed to present sufficient evidence that the speech substantially disrupted the educational process, and he argued the Court should
not “unquestioningly accept a teacher’s or administrator’s assertion that certain pure speech interfered with education.”94
Notably, the Court also rejected Fraser’s argument that his suspension
violated his due process rights by failing to give him adequate notice that his
speech was punishable. The school’s policy prohibited “[c]onduct which
materially and substantially interferes with the educational process . . .,
including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.”95 As Justice
Stevens noted in his separate dissent, both the district court and court
appeals concluded that the speech at issue was not substantially disruptive
and did not involve obscenity.96 Nevertheless, the Court simply held that
schools need “flexibility” and that “the school disciplinary rules need not be
as detailed as a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions.”97
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, decided just before Kennedy
became a Supreme Court Justice, the Court continued its abandonment of
core First Amendment principles when it held that schools can censor student speech in school-sponsored activities as long as “their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”98 In that case, the
Court held that school officials did not violate the First Amendment when
they prohibited students from writing articles in the school paper about the
impact of divorce on students and about teen pregnancy.99 The majority
explained that Tinker’s standard did not apply when schools censor “expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”100 Justice Brennan
argued in dissent that the majority had abandoned the core principles of
Tinker, which gave schools very limited power to restrict student speech, by
permitting blatant viewpoint-based discrimination, and by doing so,
threatened to turn schools into the “enclaves of totalitarianism” that Tinker
roundly rejected.101
93 Id. at 682. The Court later admitted “[t]he mode of analysis employed in Fraser is
not entirely clear.” Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007).
94 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 678 (quoting the school’s disciplinary policy) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
96 Id. at 693–95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 686 (majority opinion) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340
(1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
99 Id. at 263, 276.
100 Id. at 271.
101 Id. at 280 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Rather than serving as a backstop for the Court’s abandonment of traditional First Amendment principles in the school setting, Kennedy joined
those efforts. In 2006, he was on the bench for the Court’s decision in Morse
v. Frederick, where the Court held that schools are constitutionally permitted
to restrict student speech that they reasonably believe encourages drug
use.102 In that case, a student held up a banner at a parade students
attended with their school that read, “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”103 Kennedy
did not write separately in this case, but he joined the majority and also
joined a concurring opinion Alito authored.
The Morse majority rejected the argument that schools had broad
authority under Fraser to restrict student speech that is “offensive.”104 Nevertheless, the Court asserted that the school’s speech restrictions were constitutional. Although it recognized that the phrase in the banner was arguably
“[g]ibberish,”105 the Court held that the school’s interpretation that the banner advocated illegal drug use was “reasonable” and posed a danger to the
students.106 In reasoning that would be unthinkable outside of the school
setting, the Court confidently asserted that the school had not interfered
with political speech, asserting, “this is plainly not a case about political
debate over the criminalization of drug use or possession.”107
Notably, the Morse majority was unconcerned that the speech restriction
in that case did not satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption test or Hazelwood’s
imprimatur test.108 Instead, the Court demonstrated its willingness to create
new legal standards in each student speech case. The legal rule that comes
out of Morse is unclear, but it appears that the following principles emerge:
(1) schools are entitled to deference when interpreting what student speech
means; (2) schools are permitted to restrict that speech if it refers in any way
to drug use—and perhaps any other activity regarded as “dangerous” for
minors; and (3) Tinker’s “substantial disruption” standard does not limit the
Court’s ability to develop additional standards for restricting student speech
in the future.109 At bottom, the Court emphasized that the “special charac102 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 409 (rejecting petitioners’ argument that schools should be permitted to
restrict speech that is “offensive” but concluding that the speech restriction was nevertheless justified in this case because “[t]he concern here is not that Frederick’s speech was
offensive, but that it was reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use”).
105 Id. at 402.
106 Id. at 401 (“But Principal Morse thought the banner would be interpreted by those
viewing it as promoting illegal drug use, and that interpretation is plainly a reasonable
one.”).
107 Id. at 403.
108 See id. at 403–06.
109 See id. at 401, 405, 408; see also id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[Tinker] does not
set out the only ground on which in-school student speech may be regulated by state actors
in a way that would not be constitutional in other settings.”).
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teristics” of the school environment justify almost all of its foundational First
Amendment principles.110
In a concurring opinion, Alito—joined by Kennedy—appears to have
recognized the potentially broad sweep of the majority’s opinion and tried to
cabin it in, going so far as to say that he “join[s] the opinion of the Court on
the understanding that the opinion does not hold that the special characteristics of the public schools necessarily justify any other speech restrictions.”111
Alito praised the majority for rejecting the argument that schools could constitutionally restrict speech whenever to do so would serve their educational
missions because, although schools “are invaluable and beneficent institutions, . . . they are, after all, organs of the State.”112 Instead, the majority
opinion asserted, because schools have “custodial and tutelary responsibility
for children,”113 schools can prohibit any speech that poses a threat of violence or harm to the physical safety of its students.114 Alito recognized that
this standard would be inconsistent with the Court’s incitement cases, “[b]ut
due to the special features of the school environment, school officials must
have greater authority to intervene before speech leads to violence.”115 Alito
identifies these “special features” as the inability of parents to protect their
children themselves and “[e]xperience” demonstrating that “schools can be
places of special danger.”116 He then (unconvincingly) concluded that
“[s]peech advocating illegal drug use poses a threat to student safety that is
just as serious [as speech advocating violence], if not always as immediately
obvious.”117
Writing for the Morse dissenters, Stevens argued that the speech in Morse
did not expressly advocate illegal conduct and instead “the Court does serious violence to the First Amendment in upholding—indeed, lauding—a
school’s decision to punish Frederick for expressing a view with which it disagreed.”118 He chastised the Court for forgetting Tinker’s admonition that
there is a “constitutional imperative to permit unfettered debate, even
among high school students.”119 He concluded that “students everywhere
could be forgiven for zipping their mouths about drugs at school lest some
‘reasonable’ observer censor and then punish them.”120
The Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse decisions represent a dramatic abandonment not just of the more speech-protective standards of Tinker but also
110 See id. 403, 405, 408 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111 Id. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasizing narrowness of majority opinion).
112 Id. at 423–24.
113 Id. at 406 (majority opinion) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114 See id. at 408.
115 Id. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring).
116 Id. at 424.
117 Id. at 425.
118 Id. at 435 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119 Id. at 445.
120 Id.
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of the core fundamental principles of the First Amendment. The Court has
held it now will defer to a school’s reasonable interpretations of speech; allow
schools to prohibit lewd language on school grounds, even when not in the
classroom; and prohibit speech whenever the audience might “reasonably
perceive” the speech as bearing the school’s imprimatur. Outside of the
school context, the Court has never permitted the government to make judgments about what is and is not political speech (or even what speech is valuable and is not valuable, outside of categories of unprotected and lesserprotected speech).
The Court’s willingness to give broad authority to K–12 schools to
restrict student speech may in part rest on the minority status of their students, but a similar watering down of the rights of students in higher education suggests other reasons are at work. To be clear, the Court has waxed
poetic about the importance of the marketplace of ideas in the university
setting.121 In fact, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia,
Kennedy wrote the opinion for a 5–4 Court holding that the University of
Virginia could not bar student groups speaking from a “religious perspective”
from receiving support from the student activity fund.122 Viewing a student
activity fund as a sort of “public forum,” Kennedy applied the viewpoint-neutral requirements of the public forum doctrine to hold the exclusion unconstitutional.123 He argued that such a ban constituted viewpoint
discrimination—something the dissent rejected—and risks “the suppression
of free speech and creative inquiry in one of [its] vital centers for the
Nation’s intellectual life, its college and university campuses.”124 Kennedy’s
conclusion that restrictions on speech from a “religious perspective” is a viewpoint-based speech restriction is in keeping with his conclusion in Matal v.
Tam that restrictions on “offensive” speech are viewpoint based. In both
instances, it is not obvious that the restrictions are viewpoint based, but in
both cases, Kennedy—ever vigilant for inappropriate interference with the
marketplace of ideas—concluded that they are.125 Furthermore, Kennedy
also rejected the University’s claim that it has a right to deference in making
educational decisions as irrelevant in Rosenberger. He explained, “[w]hen the
University determines the content of the education it provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists
private entities to convey its own message.”126 In the context of a student
121 See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–81 (1972).
122 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
123 Id. at 829–30 (“The [Student Activity Fund] is a forum more in a metaphysical than
in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable.”).
124 Id. at 836.
125 See id. at 831 (“The dissent’s assertion that no viewpoint discrimination occurs
because the [g]uidelines discriminate against an entire class of viewpoints reflects an
insupportable assumption that all debate is bipolar and that antireligious speech is the only
response to religious speech.”).
126 Id. at 833.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL408.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 17

the missing marketplace of ideas theory

23-MAY-19

14:32

1741

activity fund, however, the University was not entitled to this deference
because it was not the one speaking and was instead “expend[ing] funds to
encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.”127
The Court’s most recent decision in this area, however, suggests that the
Court’s jurisprudence in the higher education setting may be on the same
path as that of the K–12 setting. In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,128 the
Court held, in a slim 5–4 opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg and joined by
Kennedy, that Hastings College of the Law’s policy that all student groups
accepting school funds had to abide by an “all-comers” rule requiring them
to accept anyone as a member was constitutional. In the case before the
Court, the Christian Legal Society had argued that it should not be required
to accept members who approved of same-sex relationships. The Court concluded that the general freedom of association principles the Court had
developed in cases like Boy Scouts of America v. Dale129 did not apply in this
context because it was a subsidy case where the student group faces “only
indirect pressure to modify its membership policies.”130 The Court reasoned
that it could apply a “less restrictive limited-public-forum analysis” because
“Hastings, through its [registered student organization] program, is dangling
the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of prohibition.”131 Not content
to rest its decision on these grounds alone, the Court went on to explain how
the “special characteristics of the school environment”132—a phrase we see
over and over again in the K–12 setting—warranted deference to the expertise of university administrators and its asserted educational goal to promote
“tolerance, cooperation, and learning among students.”133
The majority attempted to console those disappointed with its decision
with its reassurance that the policy was content neutral and did not permit
the school to engage in viewpoint-based discrimination. Kennedy’s concurring opinion emphasized the same point, that there was no showing that the
policy was designed with the purpose or effect of disadvantaging student
groups based on its views.134 But the Court’s willingness to embrace a deferential attitude to public officials potentially demonstrated a dramatic abandonment of its commitment to the university as the quintessential
marketplace of ideas. This opinion arguably leaves open the possibility of
deference to the university on a much broader range of decisions impacting
the freedom of speech.135
127 Id. at 833–34.
128 561 U.S. 661 (2010).
129 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000).
130 Christian Legal Society, 561 U.S. at 682.
131 Id. at 683.
132 Id. at 686 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n.5 (1981)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
133 Id. at 689 (quoting Joint Appendix Volume II of II at 349, Christian Legal Society, 561
U.S. 661 (No. 08-1371)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 685–90.
134 Id. at 706 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135 See Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101 MINN. L.
REV. 1801, 1833 (2017).
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Government Employees

The trajectory of the First Amendment rights of government employees
follows a path that closely resembles that of K–12 student rights. Unlike the
student speech context, however, Kennedy authored one of the Court’s
major opinions in this area that clawed back free speech rights, Garcetti v.
Ceballos,136 and significantly limited the ability of public employees to make
meaningful contributions to the marketplace of ideas.
As in the public school context, the rights of public employees appeared
robust in the late 1960s when the Court decided Pickering v. Board of Education.137 In that case, the Court held that a schoolteacher could not be fired
for criticizing the budget process of the local school board in a letter to the
editor.138 The school board contended that this letter contained false statements, undermined the reputations of the board members and school
administrators, and “would tend to foment ‘controversy, conflict and dissension’ among teachers, administrators, the Board of Education, and the
residents of the district.139 The Court first made clear that the government
lacks unbridled authority to condition employment upon the abridgement of
its employees’ expressive rights.140 But just as Tinker recognized the “special
characteristics of the school environment,”141 Pickering recognized that the
government “has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with
regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.”142 Seeing two competing interests at stake, the Court embraced a balancing test considering “the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern” against “the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”143
Although the Court embraced a balancing test and refused to set forth
any “general standard” due to the “enormous variety of fact situations,”144
the Court embraced some of the fundamental principles of the marketplace
of ideas. Echoing Holmes’s admonition that the government should not
bother with “puny anonymities,” the Court made clear that the Board was not
entitled to punish Pickering’s opinion that had no impact or effect on the
operation of the schools (“beyond its tendency to anger the Board”) or on
Pickering’s ability to do his job.145 The Court noted that the record lacked
evidence to support the Board’s argument that Pickering’s speech was disruptive. Indeed, the Court stated, “[s]o far as the record reveals, Pickering’s
136 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
137 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
138 Id. at 564–65.
139 Id. at 567.
140 Id. at 568.
141 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
142 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
143 Id. at 568.
144 Id. at 569.
145 Id. at 571–73.
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letter was greeted by everyone but its main target, the Board, with massive
apathy and total disbelief.”146
The Court also rejected the Board’s argument that it was entitled to punish Pickering for his “false” speech. Invoking the idea that the answer to false
speech is more speech, the Court explained, “[t]he Board could easily have
rebutted appellant’s errors by publishing the accurate figures itself, either via
a letter to the same newspaper or otherwise.”147 The Court also emphasized
the important contribution public employees can make to the marketplace of
ideas, noting that they are the ones “most likely to have informed and definite opinions” on matters of public concern.148 Even if a government
employee defames a public official, the Court concluded, the usual actual
malice standard from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan applies because “[t]he
public interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public
importance—the core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment—is so great.”149
Although the plaintiff in Pickering prevailed, the Court made clear that
the result was limited to the facts of that case. For example, the Court
emphasized that the speech at issue was not directed to Pickering’s immediate supervisors and did not undermine workplace harmony.150 By emphasizing that no one took Pickering’s op-ed seriously and that it had no impact,
the Court ironically suggested that more persuasive speech could be punished.151 Furthermore, the Court made clear that there might be cases
where it is not so easy to correct any false or misleading statements an
employee makes.152 It is therefore no real surprise that when lower courts
have applied the Pickering balancing test, courts tend to overvalue the government employer’s interest in restricting and punishing its employee’s speech
and undervalue the value of the speech.153
But if the balancing test the Court announced in Pickering was not the
best news for government employees, things have only gotten worse for them
since that time. Just as it clawed back the expressive rights given students in
Tinker, the Court has dramatically clawed back the expressive rights of government employees. In Connick v. Myers,154 the Court declared that the First
146 Id. at 570.
147 Id. at 572.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 573.
150 Id. at 569–70.
151 Id. at 570–73.
152 Id. at 572 (“We are thus not presented with a situation in which a teacher has carelessly made false statements about matters so closely related to the day-to-day operations of
the schools that any harmful impact on the public would be difficult to counter because of
the teacher’s presumed greater access to the real facts.”).
153 For further discussion of these problems in more detail, see, for example, MaryRose Papandrea, Social Media, Public School Teachers, and the First Amendment, 90 N.C. L. REV.
1597 (2012); Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Government Employees,
2010 BYU L. REV. 2117.
154 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
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Amendment protects only speech on matters of public concern. The Court
defined “public concern” extraordinarily narrowly and quite inconsistently
with the way it had defined that term in other First Amendment cases.155 In
Connick, the plaintiff was an assistant district attorney who had circulated a
questionnaire at work asking her colleagues about various workplace
issues.156 The Court expressed concern that extending the First Amendment
in this context would ultimately “constitutionalize” every employee grievance.157 As the four dissenting Justices pointed out, “[i]t is hornbook law,
however, that speech about ‘the manner in which government is operated or
should be operated’ is an essential part of the communications necessary for
self-governance the protection of which was a central purpose of the First
Amendment.”158 The upshot of Connick is that it permits the government to
punish employee speech without making any showing whatsoever that the
speech interfered with the operation of government functions.159 Connick’s
crimped view of the First Amendment does not fit with the marketplace of
ideas theory, which “protects the dissemination of such information so that
the people, not the courts, may evaluate its usefulness.”160
Things only got worse for government employees after Kennedy joined
the Court. Rather than expressing concern that the government might suppress employee speech that it does not like, or recognizing the important
contribution to the marketplace of ideas public employees can uniquely
make, Kennedy authored the majority opinion Garcetti v. Ceballos, which held
that an employee has no First Amendment rights when speaking pursuant to
their “official duties.”161 Although Kennedy noted that “[t]he Court has
acknowledged the importance of promoting the public’s interest in receiving
the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion,”162 he ultimately did not balance the competing interests at stake.
Instead, he embraced a bright-line rule that that when an employee speaks as
an employee rather than a citizen, the First Amendment does not apply at
155 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 456 (2011) (concluding that a protest
outside of a funeral concerned matter of public concern).
156 Connick, 461 U.S. at 141 (noting that the questionnaire covered “office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns”).
157 Id. at 154 (characterizing the claim as an attempt to “constitutionalize” an employee
grievance).
158 Id. at 156 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218
(1966)).
159 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (“If the [speech is not a matter of
public concern], the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on his or
her employer’s reaction to the speech.” (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147)).
160 Connick, 461 U.S. at 165 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (“We hold that when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from
employer discipline.”).
162 Id. at 419.
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all.163 Kennedy reasoned that excluding the employee’s speech “simply
reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has
commissioned or created.”164 Remarkably, he seemed unconcerned that
limiting government employee speech rights so dramatically would undermine the marketplace of ideas by exposing government employees to retaliation if they question government action. Furthermore, he failed to address
how this standard would apply to professors and the idea of academic freedom.165 As Stevens said in dissent, the answer to whether a government
employee’s speech is constitutionally protected in a given case should be
“[s]ometimes,” not “[n]ever.”166 Rather than balancing the competing interests, as the Court had done in Pickering, Kennedy imposed a new bright-line
rule that dramatically reduced the First Amendment rights of public
employees.
It is difficult to reconcile the Court’s commitment to the marketplace of
ideas and its jurisprudence relating to schools and government employees.
Kennedy attempted to provide an explanation in Citizens United, where the
Court held that speaker-based bans are just as bad as content-based speech
restrictions. There, he said: “The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech
restrictions that operate to the disadvantage of certain persons, but these rulings were based on an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform
their functions.”167 Yet in these areas, Kennedy and the Court more generally have permitted the government to restrict far more speech than necessary to protect government functioning.
C.

Government Speech Doctrine

In Matal v. Tam, Alito, writing for the majority, asserted that the government speech doctrine “is a doctrine that is susceptible to dangerous misuse.”168 As he explained, “[i]f private speech could be passed off as
government speech by simply affixing a government seal of approval, govern163 Id. at 421–22 (“Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s
professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have
enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what
the employer itself has commissioned or created.”).
164 Id.
165 Justice Souter raised this concern in his dissent. Id. at 438–39 (Souter, J., dissenting). Kennedy merely responded on behalf of the majority that “expression related to
academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence” and that therefore “[w]e need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the
analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech
related to scholarship or teaching.” Id. at 425 (majority opinion).
166 Id. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The proper answer to the question ‘whether the
First Amendment protects a government employee from discipline based on speech made
pursuant to the employee’s official duties,’ is ‘Sometimes,’ not ‘Never.’” (citation omitted)
(quoting id. at 413 (majority opinion)).
167 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010).
168 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1758 (2017).
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ment could silence or muffle the expression of disfavored viewpoints. For
this reason, we must exercise great caution before extending our government-speech precedents.”169
Alito’s words of caution are well taken. As it stands today, the government speech doctrine is like a “get out of jail free” card. The Court has made
clear that its foundational First Amendment principles do not apply when
the government itself is speaking. Although the idea of the government
speech doctrine makes a lot of sense, however, the Court has struggled to
flesh out the doctrine in any sort of clear and understandable way. Instead,
we see the Court lashing back and forth from case to case, sometimes finding
that the government speech doctrine is implicated, and sometimes finding
that it is not.
The Court recently decided two cases that illustrate the utter chaos of
this doctrine. In Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, a 5–4 majority held that
the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board could reject a specialty
license plate request submitted by the Sons of Confederate Veterans because
the presence of a Confederate flag violated its policy against “offensive”
license plates.170 Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for the majority, joined by
the other progressive Justices as well as Thomas. Breyer suggested a whole
host of factors might be relevant to determining whether government speech
is at issue,171 but ultimately settled on three factors as the most relevant in
this particular case: (1) the history of the program, (2) the government’s
control over speech, and (3) the perception of a reasonable person.172 The
Court ultimately determined, in an entirely unconvincing analysis,173 that
this program constituted government speech. Alito, not necessarily known as
the Court’s most rabid defender of free speech, ripped Breyer’s opinion in
dissent. He particularly had fun with the idea that a reasonable person
would think that Texas was speaking through a specialty license plate that
said, “Remax Realtors,” “Drink Dr. Pepper,” or “Go Gators” (as in the University of Florida mascot).174
Just two years after Walker, however, the Court took Tam, the offensive
trademark case, and suddenly Alito was writing the majority. In an opinion
that tracks very closely to his dissent in Walker, Alito all but ridicules the government speech argument. Alito concluded that extending the government
speech doctrine to cover trademarks “would constitute a huge and dangerous
extension of the government-speech doctrine.”175 Alito also rejected the
169 Id.
170 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2243–45
(2015).
171 Breyer noted that the Court looked at other factors in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009), that were not relevant in this case, such as the limited availability of space in the public park at issue in that case. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249.
172 Walker, 135 S.Ct. at 2248–49.
173 For an extensive criticism of Breyer’s analysis, see Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Government Brand, 110 NW. L. REV. 1195 (2016).
174 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2257.
175 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017).
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government’s argument that trademark registration is a government program that subsidizes speech. The government does not give program participants any money; instead, they must pay the government substantial fees.176
Notably, Alito lumped the trademark program into the group of many government benefits that involve the expenditure of funds, “like police and fire
protection, as well as services that are utilized by only some, e.g., the adjudication of private lawsuits and the use of public parks and highways.”177
Kennedy reached the same conclusions as Alito in Walker and in Tam,
but he did not accept Alito’s entire line of reasoning. Specifically, while he
joined the portion of Alito’s opinion in Tam rejecting the applicability of the
government speech doctrine, he did not join the second part of the majority
opinion discussing subsidized speech. Instead, Kennedy wrote his own concurrence arguing that a ban on “offensive” marks—or, as he rephrased it, a
requirement of “positivity”—constituted impermissible viewpoint
discrimination.178
In the two cases highlighted above, Kennedy is not at fault for the
Court’s flip-flop. Indeed, he appears to have gotten it “right” in both cases.
These cases are nevertheless disconcerting, however, because they demonstrate what happens when the Court engages in flimsy balancing tests that are
not guided by broader principles.
Furthermore, Kennedy hardly has clean hands when it comes to the government speech doctrine. This doctrine pops up throughout the Court’s
First Amendment jurisprudence, although the Court’s invocation of it is not
always obvious. For example, in Garcetti, Kennedy embraced the government
speech doctrine when he held that the government has absolute power to
control what its employees say when performing their job duties because they
are simply mouthpieces for the government.179 He has also suggested that
he approves of Hazelwood’s holding that schools can restrict student speech
when a reasonable person would believe that the speech bears the school’s
imprimatur.180
He has also inconsistently rejected the government’s attempts to use the
government speech doctrine to justify content-based speech restrictions.
Most notably, he was a crucial vote in Rust v. Sullivan.181 In that case, the
Court relied on the government speech doctrine in upholding a federal regulation that prohibited recipients of Title X family planning funds from
counseling patients about abortion or referring them to abortion providers.182 The Court rejected the argument that the regulation violated the
First Amendment, reasoning that “[t]his is not a case of the Government
176 Id. at 1761.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
179 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
180 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422–23 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring, joined by
Kennedy, J.) (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)).
181 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
182 Id. at 179–80.
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‘suppressing a dangerous idea,’ but of a prohibition on a project grantee or
its employees from engaging in activities outside of the project’s scope.”183
Given Kennedy’s passionate objections to any government interference with
the marketplace of ideas, it is hard to understand how Kennedy could sign
onto an opinion with this statement. After all, the clear intent of the regulation was to restrict information about abortion; in addition, the law directly
interfered with the ability of doctors to communicate medical information to
their patients.
CONCLUSION
As the Court struggles to apply traditional First Amendment doctrine,
many scholars have called for a rethinking of these rules.184 As it turns out,
however, the Supreme Court has already abandoned its usual approach to
the First Amendment in a number of important but overlooked contexts.
This Article’s examination of these contexts—public school students, public
employees, and the government speech doctrine—demonstrates the continuing importance of the marketplace of ideas theory of the freedom of expression. In these contexts, the Court has abandoned its antipathy for contentbased and even viewpoint-based rules in favor of balancing tests and multifactored inquiries. The abandonment of the Court’s usual skepticism of the
government’s reasons for restricting speech comes with real costs for individual liberty interests as well as informed public debate, as these often-overlooked areas of the law illustrate.

183
184

Id. at 194.
Post, supra note 12.

